tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post4458542171938317826..comments2024-03-18T22:32:52.802-04:00Comments on Noahpinion: "Science" without falsification is no scienceNoah Smithhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09093917601641588575noreply@blogger.comBlogger65125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-13834122273407806452017-04-07T02:57:20.633-04:002017-04-07T02:57:20.633-04:00haha great photohaha great photoAlex Peekhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16599952608457953713noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-17532015477526391532013-10-27T06:12:28.183-04:002013-10-27T06:12:28.183-04:00Mr. Smith, as much as I enjoyed your blog, I'm...Mr. Smith, as much as I enjoyed your blog, I'm afraid that I can't agree with your notion that "nobody else has" game theory. Plenty of pure mathematics departments teach and conduct extensive research in game theory. Indeed, Robert Aumann, whose work in game theory merited the Nobel Prize in Economics has never been an economist at all, holding neither a degree in economics nor a faculty position in an economics department. Rather, his PhD and his faculty position are in mathematics. John Nash, also a Nobel winner, likewise never held a degree or faculty position in economics - his academic background was also in pure mathematics. John von Neumann, the father of mathematical game theory, was also a mathematician who almost certainly would have won the Nobel if he hadn't died a decade before the launch of the Economics Nobel. <br /><br />Pure mathematicians are not the only non-economists who have contributed heavily towards game theory. Biologist John Maynard Smith has contributed the notion of the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and the classic hawk-dove (a.k.a. chicken) game. Computer scientist Andrew Yao has contributed Yao's Principle. An increasing number of political scientists and even philosophers have recently made important contributions to game theory. <br /><br />So while I agree that economists currently are responsible for much - probably even the majority - of the advances in game theory, it's simply not correct to assert that "nobody else has" game theory. sakkyhttp://www.www.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-71456524184513576442012-07-23T18:18:37.629-04:002012-07-23T18:18:37.629-04:00Rationalism (in the ordinary sense) is a necessary...Rationalism (in the ordinary sense) is a necessary adjunct to empiricism, but rationalism doesn't work without starting assumptions.<br /><br />And the *only possible way* to select *most* of your "starting assumptions" is with empirical testing.<br /><br />There are also certain very basic starting assumptions which are questioned mainly by idiotic post-modernists. The basis of these assumptions -- logic works, there is continuity except when there is change, etc. -- is that it is impossible to live without making these assumptions. Perhaps I will wake up tomorrow and the sun will be made of green cheese, but it is *impossible to live that way*. Perhaps logic will suddenly fail, but it is *impossible to live that way*. Literally everyone makes these very minimal assumptions all the time even if they claim that they don't. They are therefore not really arguable.neroden@gmailhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07475686367097445497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-56531495753125305582012-07-23T18:14:40.856-04:002012-07-23T18:14:40.856-04:00"Very interesting. But even if Samuelson didn..."Very interesting. But even if Samuelson didn't make the claim, didn't lots of people think he did?"<br /><br />Yep. This is one reason it's dead easy to beat the market if you have the time and energy to invest in research -- even when accurate information is available publicly, most people never take the time to FIND the accurate information, and rely on any old third-hand rumors.neroden@gmailhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07475686367097445497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-37043433400799602672012-07-23T18:12:57.368-04:002012-07-23T18:12:57.368-04:00"The reason I mention it is that it provides ..."The reason I mention it is that it provides a justification for discretionary macro trading, which is what I do. People ask: how do you think you can beat the market. The answer is that the market is made up of finance people who are even more inclined then academics to work backwards from their prejudices to the evidence. People who train themselves to work forwards ought to have an edge."<br /><br />Bingo! I don't do true macro trading because I don't feel that I can predict it in a way which is distinct enough from the average trader (not well trained enough), but I do do sectoral analysis on that basis: I know that the vast majority of market participants are operating from prejudices which I do not share, and I analyze the future performance of sectors based on ecological, economic, and sociological fundamentals.neroden@gmailhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07475686367097445497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-2935994011799892382012-07-23T18:10:18.307-04:002012-07-23T18:10:18.307-04:00Yep. This was described by Brad DeLong as "t...Yep. This was described by Brad DeLong as "the economics credentialing system is broken".<br /><br />The credentialing system has broken in other fields in the past; it's irreparably broken in philosophy and has been for years (with the result that most interesting philosophy happens outside philosophy departments). <br /><br />Both linguistics (with the idiot computational linguists driving out historical linguists) and physics (with the idiot string theorists driving out experimental physicists) were at risk of system breakdown, but both seem to be slowly self-correcting.neroden@gmailhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07475686367097445497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-55141128036072924332012-07-23T18:06:09.071-04:002012-07-23T18:06:09.071-04:00Parts of micro find real stuff.
Classical micro (...Parts of micro find real stuff.<br /><br />Classical micro (as opposed to modern experimental micro, game-theory micro, behavioral micro, etc,, all of which found useful stuff) is STILL HANGING ON. Last useful thing classical micro found was what, supply and demand?<br /><br />That says that there are some really sick cultural problems in econ deparments.neroden@gmailhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07475686367097445497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-44368928839294696992012-07-23T17:58:09.353-04:002012-07-23T17:58:09.353-04:00Microeconoimcs is sick too, and in the same way --...Microeconoimcs is sick too, and in the same way -- failure to take out the trash.<br /><br />Consider this line from Wikipedia: "It is assumed that all firms are following rational decision-making, and will produce at the profit-maximizing output."<br /><br />....this assumption is so bogus I shouldn't need to explain why it's bogus. Yet it has not been abolished from the teaching of microeconomics 101, and microeconomists allow it to fester on Wikipedia.neroden@gmailhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07475686367097445497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-75259624729762814072012-07-21T19:54:38.389-04:002012-07-21T19:54:38.389-04:00Dear Major_Freedom,
I have just read your respons...Dear Major_Freedom,<br /><br />I have just read your response and I am delighted that you have responded. I thought that you were not going to respond.<br /><br />It is late, 1am in the UK. I will come back to you another day.<br /><br />Thank you,<br /><br />David Lilleydavid Lilleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02904652639685069473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-57653911174119289292012-07-16T20:48:38.660-04:002012-07-16T20:48:38.660-04:002/2
David Lilley:
5. You keep displaying propos...2/2<br /><br /><b>David Lilley</b>:<br /><br /><br /><i>5. You keep displaying propositions/statements but Popper is adamant that cosmologists should talk about the world and not words.</i><br /><br />Propositions are statements concerning the world. Propositions can be either true or false, depending on their fidelity with reality.<br /><br /><i>6. The critical rationalist doesn't change with time.</i><br /><br />Yes, he in fact does. He LEARNS. Or else why engage in critical rationalism in the first place? Learning over time changes a person over time.<br /><br /><i>Have you read Popper's "elimination of psychologism".</i><br /><br />Yes.<br /><br /><i>7. Pythagoras' theorem is maths and maths is a place where there is the concept of proof. Pythagoras proved his maths theory and we don't need to use scientific method to test it.</i><br /><br />The same thing is true for the logic of action. It cannot be tested, because the very testing would itself be an action, and subject to the same logical constraints in the propositions you think have to be "tested" before we can know they're true.<br /><br /><i>8. Economic principles are grounded in Adam Smith's work rather than sociology or psychology. Even modern Nobel prize winning economists only deal in fairy dust like the Keynsian multiplier.</i><br /><br />Economic principles can only be principles if they are grounded in logical constraints of action.<br /><br /><i>I don't think we disagree about much. We are both basically critical rationalists which is why we are having this discussion.</i><br /><br />I'm actually not a critical rationalist. It presumes constancy in the operation of causes. I reject that when it comes to knowledge. I do not think there are any scientific constants that can enable me to predict my own future knowledge path, before I go out and learn it. I also cannot coherently regard myself as past causally determined. I also reject the skepticism that Popperism invariably leads to. I also reject the social engineering implications of Popperism. I'm really not a Popperist in any sense.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-87990049906473787412012-07-16T20:48:07.144-04:002012-07-16T20:48:07.144-04:001/2
David Lilley:
1. Laws of nature do not chang...1/2<br /><br /><b>David Lilley</b>:<br /><br /><i>1. Laws of nature do not change with time. For example, Newton's third law tells us something about everything that has moved, is moving and will move and contact another object.</i><br /><br />Of course. I don't see how this is an error I made, but regardless, my point is that this constancy assumption, does not, indeed cannot, apply to human knowledge and action. For the very process of studying the world, presumably makes us learn about the world in an a priori unpredictable way. To the extent that such knowledge influences our actions, then our actions also change. <br /><br /><i>2. All science is done for the benefit of "one person", the critical rationalist, who can take it and use it and hopefully take it further. The prefix "critical" was applied to distance the concept from the rationalists like Descartes.</i><br /><br />And "rationalism" was applied to distance himself from the radical empiricists Hume and Locke.<br /><br />He ended up with something that was still self-defeating.<br /><br /><i>3. Kant, but this is going back a bit, had the notion of a priori truths. But the fact is that once any conjecture is put on the table before our "one person" it is there to be tested. It isn't in a different set.</i><br /><br />Is <i>that</i> assertion an a priori truth, or an empirical hyppthesis, or something else?<br /><br />Tested how exactly? What if the proposition is true, but not observable, like the concept of observation itself, which must be understood? I can never observe anyone making an observation. I can observe them moving, and behaving, and putting various tools to their eyes and whatnot, but in order for me to conclude that observations are taking place, I have to understand it by knowing that I make observations (which is also unobservable to others and also must be understood).<br /><br /><i>4. I thought that the logical posivitist/linguistic school was dead and that is why I have been so negative about your use of the term posivitism. I thought that we both agreed that logical posivitism had been replaced by the "falsifiability criterion".</i><br /><br />The core problem hasn't gone away, namely, the issue of the logical status of the "falsifiability criterion" itself.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-36747185679479446802012-07-09T18:16:03.354-04:002012-07-09T18:16:03.354-04:00Major_Freedom:
I am pleased that you take such ti...Major_Freedom:<br /><br />I am pleased that you take such time and effort to respond to me.<br /><br />I am also pleased that you have studied Popper. <br /><br />I don't know if any have stood on Popper's shoulders and seen further. I last read some epistimology 40 years ago. I concluded that I didn't need to read more as the two biggest problems in philosphy had been solved, there would be no more philosophers but instead an army of scientific disciplines advancing our understanding of the world and contributing to "World 4". The question "how does knowledge grow?" has been solved by Popper and the question "which behaviour is right and which wrong?" by Kant.<br /><br />I think you are making some mistakes, as follows:<br /><br />1. Laws of nature do not change with time. For example, Newton's third law tells us something about everything that has moved, is moving and will move and contact another object.<br /><br />2. All science is done for the benefit of "one person", the critical rationalist, who can take it and use it and hopefully take it further. The prefix "critical" was applied to distance the concept from the rationalists like Descartes.<br /><br />3. Kant, but this is going back a bit, had the notion of a priori truths. But the fact is that once any conjecture is put on the table before our "one person" it is there to be tested. It isn't in a different set.<br /><br />4. I thought that the logical posivitist/linguistic school was dead and that is why I have been so negative about your use of the term posivitism. I thought that we both agreed that logical posivitism had been replaced by the "falsifiability criterion".<br /><br />5. You keep displaying propositions/statements but Popper is adamant that cosmologists should talk about the world and not words.<br /><br />6. The critical rationalist doesn't change with time. Have you read Popper's "elimination of psychologism". <br /><br />7. Pythagoras' theorem is maths and maths is a place where there is the concept of proof. Pythagoras proved his maths theory and we don't need to use scientific method to test it.<br /><br />8. Economic principles are grounded in Adam Smith's work rather than sociology or psychology. Even modern Nobel prize winning economists only deal in fairy dust like the Keynsian multiplier.<br /><br />I don't think we disagree about much. We are both basically critical rationalists which is why we are having this discussion. I may be letting you down because I only konw Popper and have read nothing new in the last forty years.david Lilleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02904652639685069473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-90191077716929922382012-07-09T16:15:09.022-04:002012-07-09T16:15:09.022-04:00Oh, that's just Russell's Paradox. Does t...Oh, that's just Russell's Paradox. Does the set of all sets that do not contain themselves contain itself? Does the rule that every rule has an exception have an exception? If a web page consists entirely of links to every web page that doesn't link to itself, does it link to itself?<br /><br />A great many disciplines with useful results are vulnerable to this when naïvely formulated. For example, mathematics. Qualifying the definition of X so that this can't happen is the correct solution; again, see mathematics. Of course not every proposition about "all statements" can be a "statement" encompassing itself, or you'll get a paradox. So, why is it a <i>statement</i> at all? Do the people you’re criticizing define <i>statement</i> that way?<br /><br />Beyond that, why would option 2 even be a problem? Sure, you can always say you prefer a word to mean something else. So what? Where can't you do this? How does that constitute a counterargument?Loreheadhttp://openid.org/Loreheadnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-41355550109135901652012-07-08T15:50:41.269-04:002012-07-08T15:50:41.269-04:003/3
David Lilley:
If they fail to honour their ...3/3<br /><br /><b>David Lilley</b>:<br /><br /><br /><i>If they fail to honour their predictions, if they fail to be coroborated by the evidence, they are simply junk and we move on. But we move on thanks to knowing what is junk knowledge.</i><br /><br />Do all economic theories have to be of the form of a prediction? Suppose I said the following:<br /><br />"Whenever the supply of a good increases by one additional unit, provided each unit is regarded as of equal serviceability by a person, the value attached to this unit must decrease. For this additional unit can only be employed as a means for the attainment of a goal that is considered less valuable than the least valued goal satisfied by a unit of such good if the supply were one unit shorter."<br /><br />Is this proposition a proposition that COULD be wrong, in which case it is not an apodictically true statement, but only a hypothesis that needs to be tested before we can know?<br /><br />Or how about this proposition: <br /><br />"Whenever two parties engage in a voluntary trade, both parties expect to benefit from the trade ex ante, or else they would not trade."<br /><br />Is this proposition a proposition that COULD be wrong, in which case it is not an apodictically true statement, but only a hypothesis that needs to be tested before we can know?<br /><br />Or one final proposition:<br /><br />"Whenever the quantity of money is increased while the demand for money to be held as cash reserve on hand is unchanged, the purchasing power of money will fall."<br /><br />Is this proposition a proposition that COULD be wrong, in which case it is not an apodictically true statement, but only a hypothesis that needs to be tested before we can know?<br /><br />---------<br /><br />Considering the above three propositions, would you say that the validation method is the same as it is in the natural sciences? Are they only hypotheses in the same sense as propositions concerning the outcome of mixing two natural materials? Do we have to test these propositions continuously against observations?<br /><br />I submit that anyone who says the above three propositions are only hypothetical, which could be wrong, and need to be tested empirically before we can be sure, is simply not grasping the meaning of the propositions. It would be like someone being taught the Pythagorean theorem, and then demanding that the educator show example after example of empirical right triangles to "prove" the educator isn't just spewing a dogmatic belief or baseless conjecture. That the Pythagorean theorem is only valid once it is established empirically by observing datasets of right triangles and making sure each one does abide by the relation claimed by the educator.<br /><br />Economic principles are like the Pythagorean theorem in this respect. They are propositions of the form that although they may have been awakened by observation, nevertheless the validation process, the way we know they're true, is not grounded in empirical observation the way the outcome of mixing two chemicals is grounded in observation, but rather is grounded in the logic of right triangles. Economic principles are grounded in the logic of individual human action.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-50859126419554859752012-07-08T15:50:13.641-04:002012-07-08T15:50:13.641-04:002/3
David Lilley:
Just looking at your last para...2/3<br /><br /><b>David Lilley</b>:<br /><br /><i>Just looking at your last paragraph above. "I don't believe." I never use the word. It belongs to Soren Kirtegarde and to me represents the final apology. "No we are not saying six days, everything revolves around the earth, Adan and Eve etc. We are saying nothing, we have no cosmology, Gallelo, Newton and Darwin are cool. We are in the faith/belief game. No more putting holes in our cosmological blanket, no more apologists. We have a new clean skin. Its a belief system, a faith. He is there for you if, and only if, you junk reason and take the Abramic hook."</i><br /><br />I call all convinctions I hold as incorrect: "beliefs." Please understand that I did not intend to convey the impression that you are a dogmatist who wants to put forward "belief" as a valid foundation. I am just saying that the notion that the only valid knowledge is through EP, is a "belief". It cannot be a knowledge in my view, because my view is that it is wrong.<br /><br /><i>You have all the prose of an epistemologist but use terms like belief which is foriengn to us and accuse me of having hypothesis's. Hypothesis's are only guesses. We don't have "true hypothetical propositions/pronouncements" We only have guesses and we put them to the test and immediately junk them if they fail the test.</i><br /><br />Perhaps I need to go deeper to show you what I mean:<br /><br />When you say that hypotheses and theories and guesses have to be "put to the test", when you say we should "junk them" if they fail the test, and so on, I would like to address your attention to a tacit presumption that is being made when you do that. The tacit presumption is the a priori proposition that the truth of things does not change over the course of time. That if you propose a hypothesis, then it is assumed that no matter when in the future the hypothesis is tested, the same criteria applies, namely, whatever the results of this test happen to be, you say the result either "junks" the hypothesis (I use the phrase "falsify" to describe what you are doing), or "passes the test" (I use the phrase "confirm" to describe what you are doing).<br /><br />The ONLY way that "junks the hypothesis" or "passes the test" can be meaningful conclusions to make concerning a hypothesis proposed in the past, is if all that is true back when the hypothesis is made, is <i>still</i> true when the conclusion is made to junk or pass the hypothesis.<br /><br />In other words, in the course of engaging in the "testing" methodology you are talking about, the a priori proposition: "The truth of reality that we are trying to discover today, is the same as it was in the past, and is the same as it always will be in the future."<br /><br />For if the truth of things did change over time, like for example if the physical laws of the universe changed over time, then you could not possibly say that a past hypothesis or past set of observations <i>contradicted</i> a current hypothesis or current set of observations, or "falsified" them, or "refuted" them, or in your parlance "junks" them.<br /><br />This a priori proposition, that truths are constant over time, is, I must implore you, <i>not</i> a part of the "testing" methodology itself. It is an assumption that is appended to the "testing" method from without.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-87271506274204393252012-07-08T15:49:25.827-04:002012-07-08T15:49:25.827-04:00David Lilley:
I agree that we should remain on su...<b>David Lilley</b>:<br /><br /><i>I agree that we should remain on subject and the subject/post was economics.</i><br /><br />No, the subject was the philosophy of science. How it pertains to economics is interesting, and what I brought up, but it is actually subsidiary.<br /><br /><i>I and others were sucked into commenting by the words "falsication" and "science". Your comments too were in the vain of epistimology rather than economics and it is to this thread that I responded.</i><br /><br /><i>Some commenters mentioned Khun and one mentioned Whewell. You mentioned "a priori", which to me means Kant, and "positivism" which to me means the positivists and the lingists.</i><br /><br />Positivism is characterized by the following two major ideas:<br /><br />1. All valid propositions that say something true about the real world must be verifiable, or at least falsifiable by experience, where experience is only empirical observations.<br /><br />2. Related to the first, there is no distinction between theoretical explanations and historical explanations.<br /><br /><i>It is to these concepts that I responded. Kant's a priori (I would have to refresh my memory on what a priori is) and posivitism are not in the modern epistomological lexicon just as we no longer debate push and pull.</i><br /><br />The "modern lexicon" is diverse and very rich. Please don't pretend that there is a monopoly ideology.<br /><br /><i>We go forward standing on the shoulders of Popper. In 1934 he gave us the "falsification criteria" to demarcate between that which we should bother to think about and that which was not worth thinking about because it couldn't be tested anyway.</i><br /><br />It is precisely Popper's epistemology that I hold as self-contradictory, which was the motivation for my initial series of posts<br /><br /><i>Some 50 years later, after being introduced to Tarski, he concluded that knowledge that had passed the falsifiablity criteria and met every test thrown at it met the Tarski truth standard of "correspondance with the facts". Every judge, jurer and solicitor would have recognised this long before the great logician Tarski formalised it in logic. Popper then claimed that such knowledge was "objective knowledge" and the best of our knowledge of the world we live in and dwarfed subjecive knowledge (opinion) and dogmatic knowledge (belief) which didn't even enter the frame.</i><br /><br />Popper failed to refute rationalism. I mean REAL rationalism, not his misnamed "critical rationalism."<br /><br /><i>I do bow however to your critisism. Popper pointed out in volume 2 of "The Open society and its Enemies" that to choose to be a critical rationalist was an emotive decision.</i><br /><br /><i>I may be wrong. I read Popper some 40 years ago whilst studying mechanical engineering and have never revisited it. In my engineering career I never used the words proof, verify, confirm or falsify but consistently used the term corroboration which was entirely consistent with an industry where every design had to meet third party certification by DNV or similar.</i><br /><br />Corroboration is another word for peer review, and peer review is the result of a democratic influence into science, where not only should politicians be elected by majority vote, but valid theories must pass this voting test as well. It does a fairly decent job, but there are some problems with it, the most obvious being when an eccentric, ahead of their time thinkers and scientists fail to gain deserved recognition for their discoveries because the majority of scientists' careers and incomes would be threatened if the new ideas became dominant. It is not common, but it does happen, and because of that, I reject the absolutist position that corroboration is necessary. I choose to reserve to myself the final judgment, rather than depending on committees, which MAY be wrong.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-87590945014659516202012-07-07T20:49:46.858-04:002012-07-07T20:49:46.858-04:00Major_Freedom,
I agree that we should remain on s...Major_Freedom,<br /><br />I agree that we should remain on subject and the subject/post was economics.<br /><br />I and others were sucked into commenting by the words "falsication" and "science". Your comments too were in the vain of epistimology rather than economics and it is to this thread that I responded.<br /><br />Some commenters mentioned Khun and one mentioned Whewell. You mentioned "a priori", which to me means Kant, and "positivism" which to me means the positivists and the lingists.<br /><br />It is to these concepts that I responded. Kant's a priori (I would have to refresh my memory on what a priori is) and posivitism are not in the modern epistomological lexicon just as we no longer debate push and pull.<br /><br />We go forward standing on the shoulders of Popper. In 1934 he gave us the "falsification criteria" to demarcate between that which we should bother to think about and that which was not worth thinking about because it couldn't be tested anyway.<br /><br />Some 50 years later, after being introduced to Tarski, he concluded that knowledge that had passed the falsifiablity criteria and met every test thrown at it met the Tarski truth standard of "correspondance with the facts". Every judge, jurer and solicitor would have recognised this long before the great logician Tarski formalised it in logic. Popper then claimed that such knowledge was "objective knowledge" and the best of our knowledge of the world we live in and dwarfed subjecive knowledge (opinion) and dogmatic knowledge (belief) which didn't even enter the frame.<br /><br />I do bow however to your critisism. Popper pointed out in volume 2 of "The Open society and its Enemies" that to choose to be a critical rationalist was an emotive decision.<br /><br />I may be wrong. I read Popper some 40 years ago whilst studying mechanical engineering and have never revisited it. In my engineering career I never used the words proof, verify, confirm or falsify but consistently used the term corroboration which was entirely consistent with an industry where every design had to meet third party certification by DNV or similar.<br /><br />Just looking at your last paragraph above. "I don't believe." I never use the word. It belongs to Soren Kirtegarde and to me represents the final apology. "No we are not saying six days, everything revolves around the earth, Adan and Eve etc. We are saying nothing, we have no cosmology, Gallelo, Newton and Darwin are cool. We are in the faith/belief game. No more putting holes in our cosmological blanket, no more apologists. We have a new clean skin. Its a belief system, a faith. He is there for you if, and only if, you junk reason and take the Abramic hook."<br /><br />You have all the prose of an epistemologist but use terms like belief which is foriengn to us and accuse me of having hypothesis's. Hypothesis's are only guesses. We don't have "true hypothetical propositions/pronouncements" We only have guesses and we put them to the test and immediately junk them if they fail the test. If they fail to honour their predictions, if they fail to be coroborated by the evidence, they are simply junk and we move on. But we move on thanks to knowing what is junk knowledge.david Lilleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02904652639685069473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-7891951403561161522012-07-07T10:57:36.706-04:002012-07-07T10:57:36.706-04:00David:
A shorter version of what I am saying:
As...David:<br /><br />A shorter version of what I am saying:<br /><br />Ask yourself this:<br /><br />Is your belief that falsification is the only valid method of acquiring knowledge about reality, itself a falsifiable belief? In other words, can your belief in principle be falsified? Will you be consistent enough to say that your belief <i>might</i> be wrong? That it is <i>possible</i> that there exists another valid method of acquiring knowledge about reality, that will falsify your belief?<br /><br />If you answered no any of these questions, then you must admit your belief is an a priori true nonfalsifiable proposition, and thus you make room for a discipline such as economics claiming to produce a priori valid empirical knowledge.<br /><br />If you answered yes to all of these questions, then you must admit that your belief is itself only a hypothesis, i.e. a hypothetically true proposition regarding hypothetically true propositions, which of course cannot qualify as an epistemological pronouncement. For it would not provide any justification that propositions are not, and cannot be, categorically, or a priori true.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-57757466169484180572012-07-06T12:48:48.872-04:002012-07-06T12:48:48.872-04:003/3
David Lilley:
Jump ahead of the only game in...3/3<br /><br />David Lilley:<br /><br /><i>Jump ahead of the only game in town, "my theory is falsifiable and has survived independent testing determined to wreck my theory" and we will listen to you.</i><br /><br />Then you won't listen to me, because my argument is a criticism of the notion that the only valid economic propositions are ones that are "falsifiable."<br /><br />Let me turn this around. Suppose I held that valid economic propositions are not falsifiable, but a priori true. Suppose I then demanded that you prove your falsifiable theories as true, but only if you present them as a priori arguments. Would that be fair to you? It won't, correct? So how can you demand that I play by <i>your</i> rules, when my argument is precisely a criticism of those very rules?!<br /><br /><i>There are three kinds of knowledge and two are rubbish. There is objective kmowledge that passes the test and has verisimitude. There is subjectice knowledge that is nothing more than your idiosincratic opionion and there is belief.</i><br /><br />OK, then <i>what of that very statement itself</i>? Is that statement you just made an objective knowledge that passes the test? Or is it subjective knowledge that is nothing more than your idiosyncratic opinion? Or is it a belief?<br /><br />If it is objective knowledge, then from whence did it arise? What is the grounding for its validity? <br /><br />Clearly it cannot arise from "testing" itself, since any proposition cannot be considered valid on the basis of presupposing itself as its own premise, for that would be begging the question. <br /><br />Is it a subjective opinion then? Or a belief? If so, then by your own logic, it's rubbish.<br /><br />So here you are telling me the proposition that there are only three forms of knowledge, two of which are rubbish. And yet, that very statement itself requires a priori knowledge that is grounded in something external to the very proposition itself.<br /><br /><i>Who gives a monkies about your opinion or belief. Give us something that passes the test and we are all ears.</i><br /><br />My argument is a criticism of the very "testing" criterion you're demanding is the only valid one. You can't possibly demand that I prove myself BY WAY OF USING the very method I am arguing against!<br /><br />How about instead of demanding that I adopt your method, why don't you actually understand what I am saying? It should have been obvious to you that what you're demanding is impossible for anyone to do.<br /><br />Please note that I am not trying to slip in religion through the back door. I am simply reasserting rationalism as the only valid epistemology for human actors, and that empiricist-positivism contradicts itself.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-83598302364226825912012-07-06T12:47:13.157-04:002012-07-06T12:47:13.157-04:002/3
David Lilley:
If they pass the tests they in...2/3<br /><br />David Lilley:<br /><br /><i>If they pass the tests they increase their verisimitute (their truth-like-ness) but may still fail tomorrow's test. They always remain tentative but increase their truthlikeness as they pass more independent testing.</i><br /><br />Passing the test is a confirmation. Failing the test is a falsification.<br /><br /><i>When, and only when, they are as sound as a bell (corroborated by independent testers) they become "objective knowledge". But they still only hang on their truthlikeness (verisimiltude) and may be shot down tomorrow by a better theory that has greater verisimitude.</i><br /><br />You're talking about positivism, and you don't even know it.<br /><br /><i>We never confirm a theory. Every theory remains tentative and hangs on its verisimitude and may be junked tomorrow by a better explanation with greater virisimitude.</i><br /><br />Confirmation doesn't mean verification. I think you are conflating the two. You thought by confirmation I meant verification. No, by confirmation I simply mean a tentative acceptance of a theory that of course can itself be falsified or re-confirmed at a later date.<br /><br /><i>Your therories about epistomolology cannot be exempted from scrutiny and the acid test of "independent testing". They fail the corroboration test, the one and only test.</i><br /><br />The "corroboration test" is actually the fallacy of authority, or ad populum, depending on who you are referring to.<br /><br />Truth is not determined by vote. Truth is determined by reason. By logic and evidence depending on the type of proposition. Einstein was not wrong or right depending on how many others had the same thoughts as he at the time he thought those thoughts. Even if no other scientist "corroborated" his thoughts, they wouldn't become any more or less right or wrong that it always was.<br /><br />More importantly however, "independent testing" is just failing to see outside the positivist box. If the argument I am making is AGAINST positivism, then you cannot possibly demand that I prove it to you by way of...positivist methodology.<br /><br />It would be like a theist demanding that an atheist prove the universe contains no God, by relying on a method that presupposes God exists.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-77373933817604017092012-07-06T12:46:35.917-04:002012-07-06T12:46:35.917-04:00David Lilley:
Wow.
You post EP and shoot it down...David Lilley:<br /><br /><i>Wow.</i><br /><br /><i>You post EP and shoot it down. But there isn't any EP to be seen.</i><br /><br />Of course there is. Are you reading the same blog post as I am? The one titled "Science <i>without falsification</i> is no science"?<br /><br />Falsification is the heart of EP.<br /><br /><i>We have not mentioned the positivitists for some fifty years. Nor the linguists.</i><br /><br />I was talking about the article posted here. I don't know what you mean by "we have not mentioned the positivists." In this article, I read:<br /><br />"The root problem here is that macroeconomics seems to have no commonly agreed-upon criteria for falsification of hypotheses."<br /><br />and<br /><br />"So as things stand, macro is mostly a "science" without falsification. In other words, it is barely a science at all. Microeconomists know this. The educated public knows this. And that is why the prestige of the macro field is falling. The solution is for macroeconomists to A) admit their ignorance more often (see this Mankiw article and this Cochrane article for good examples of how to do this), and B) search for better ways to falsify macro theories in a convincing way."<br /><br />Those are very clear statements. N. Smith is clearly advocating for "better" positivism in macro-economics. <br /><br />Apparently you missed the last 50 years where the economics profession has almost universally adopted EP. What are you talking about "we have not mentioned the positivists for some fifty years"? Virtually every economics practitioner is a positivist. This article is calling for better falsification in macro-economics. That <i>is</i> positivism.<br /><br /><i>Laws of nature such as "to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction" are not here one minute and gone the next. They are here to stay. And the problem solvers do not change from one minute to the next. They are searchers for the truth. And even if they did change as time went by we don't rely on them. We rely on corroboration by independent third parties.</i><br /><br />Where to begin with this one. <br /><br />First, I actually didn't say the problem solvers changed "one minute to the next." Did you mean to attribute that to me? I said the problem solvers change over time. This is incontrovertible. The very process of positivism, of falsification, <i>presupposes</i> that change is taking place, specifically in the problem solver's <i>knowledge</i>, and hence those actions that are influenced by such knowledge.<br /><br />Second, relying on independent third parties doesn't overcome the fact of change, for the third parties are people too, and they also learn over time. They change as well. For economics, third parties are other economists, who are, presumably, learning as well, or else they would not even be viewed as credible third parties. I am quite honestly baffled how you can believe that "independent third parties" somehow transcends the "issue" of problem solvers changing over time in their knowledge and their actions to the extent they are influenced by their knowledge. Third parties are actors as well! Unless you're talking about God or robot third parties, which I am assuming you weren't.<br /><br /><i>We don't falsify or confirm our theories. We test them.</i><br /><br />That means the same thing. Testing a theory is a process of falsifying/confirming that theory.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-50661592989129091972012-07-05T19:59:20.761-04:002012-07-05T19:59:20.761-04:00Dear Major_Freedom,
Wow.
You post EP and shoot i...Dear Major_Freedom,<br /><br />Wow.<br /><br />You post EP and shoot it down. But there isn't any EP to be seen. <br /><br />We have not mentioned the positivitists for some fifty years. Nor the linguists.<br /><br />Laws of nature such as "to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction" are not here one minute and gone the next. They are here to stay. And the problem solvers do not change from one minute to the next. They are searchers for the truth. And even if they did change as time went by we don't rely on them. We rely on corroboration by independent third parties.<br /><br />We don't falsify or confirm our theories. We test them. If they pass the tests they increase their verisimitute (their truth-like-ness) but may still fail tomorrow's test. They always remain tentative but increase their truthlikeness as they pass more independent testing. <br /><br />When, and only when, they are as sound as a bell (corroborated by independent testers) they become "objective knowledge". But they still only hang on their truthlikeness (verisimiltude) and may be shot down tomorrow by a better theory that has greater verisimitude.<br /><br />We never confirm a theory. Every theory remains tentative and hangs on its verisimitude and may be junked tomorrow by a better explanation with greater virisimitude.<br /><br />Your therories about epistomolology cannot be exempted from scrutiny and the acid test of "independent testing". They fail the corroboration test, the one and only test.<br /><br />Jump ahead of the only game in town, "my theory is falsifiable and has survived independent testing determined to wreck my theory" and we will listen to you.<br /><br />There are three kinds of knowledge and two are rubbish. There is objective kmowledge that passes the test and has verisimitude. There is subjectice knowledge that is nothing more than your idiosincratic opionion and there is belief.<br /><br />Who gives a monkies about your opinion or belief. Give us something that passes the test and we are all ears.david Lilleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02904652639685069473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-60292036088210403442012-07-04T11:11:37.825-04:002012-07-04T11:11:37.825-04:003/3
The above may turn you off, since for decades...3/3<br /><br />The above may turn you off, since for decades macro-economists, and economists in general, have been assuming constancy in their models, and as a result, we would be compelled to conclude that governments and universities around the world have wasted billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of man-hours engaging in a self-contradictory methodology. However, nobody ever said the enlightenment was a smooth transition that didn't embarrass anyone.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-20833259770763857452012-07-04T11:11:13.783-04:002012-07-04T11:11:13.783-04:002/3
There is a further major problem with EP, and...2/3<br /><br />There is a further major problem with EP, and it has to do with an implicit assumption being made in the process of falsification and confirmation, an assumption that cannot possibly be correct when applied to economics.<br /><br />The implicit assumption being made in the process of falsification and confirmation in EP is one of constancy of laws in nature; that the truth of what is being studied does not change over time. For consider. First we make a hypothesis. Then, after some time, we perform a test. Then, after some more time, we learn if the results of the test are consistent/inconsistent with our initial theory proposed in the past. In order for us to say the results "falsify" our past theory, or in order for us to say the results "confirm" our past theory, we have to presuppose that the truths of reality did not change from the time we proposed the theory, to the time we determined that a theory has been falsified or confirmed.<br /><br />For if the truths of reality did change over time, then we cannot say the results of a test "falsified" or "confirmed" a past test. All we could say is that we made observations in the past, and then we made observations in the present, that they look different, or they look the same, but nothing follows from this. Only if we presuppose constancy in nature, can "falsification" and "confirmation" become coherent and meaningful. <br /><br />Now, why is this a problem for economics? Well, first we have to realize that economics is the study of human action. It is not a study of atoms, molecules, or the physics of stars. Economics deals with what people <i>do.</i> I <i>buy</i> a hamburger for $5.00. I <i>sell</i> a hamburger for $5.00. I <i>invest</i> in a restaurant. I <i>disinvest</i> from the restaurant. I <i>exchange</i> Dollars for Francs. I <i>work</i> for a wage. I <i>research</i> for a profit. And so on.<br /><br />The next thing to realize is the reality of what is happening to the EPs themselves who conduct the falsification/confirmation experiments and tests. Well, what is happening to them? Is an EP the same person after an experiment as he was before the experiment? Of course not! For the whole purpose of engaging in the EP methodology in the first place is for the experimenter to LEARN something that he did not know before! So we must admit that the experimenter has <i>changed</i> over time. We cannot even conceive of an experimenter who remains the same person throughout his life as an experimenter. And not only that, but we must also admit that the experimenter is changing in ways that not even the experimenter himself can know beforehand, for the whole purpose of research and experimentation would otherwise be a giant waste of time, as no experiments would be needed due to the experimenter knowing the results of all possible experiments beforehand.<br /><br />So EPs are compelled to admit that the constancy assumption they believe applies to what they are studying when they engage in falsification and confirmation, <i>is not applicable to themselves as actors, as learners</i>, who change over the process of EP methodology itself.<br /><br />This can be difficult to fully grasp, so let me state it another way. In order for the EP experimenter (imagine an econometrician who collects data and tests his hypothesized model) to even engage in his own methodology, he MUST presuppose a non-constancy in his own self, for that is the only way that learning is even possible. Learning presupposes change, not constancy. And more importantly, to the extent that our acquired knowledge influences what we do as actors, <i>no scientific predictions based on constancy of causal relations are possible.</i><br /><br />Constant causal relations, in other words, cannot coherently be regarded as inherent in human action, and hence economics in general.Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17232051.post-34764408684296278272012-07-04T11:10:27.974-04:002012-07-04T11:10:27.974-04:00Empiricist-positivism (hereafter referred to as EP...Empiricist-positivism (hereafter referred to as EP) is a self-contradictory epistemology.<br /><br />The EP position holds that there is no such thing as synthetic a priori true statements, and, as a corollary, it holds that all declarative statements can only be either empirical and hence hypothetical, or analytic and hence stipulative.<br /><br />Empirical and hence hypothetical statements are presented as being in principle falsifiable, and cannot be claimed as incontrovertibly true. Analytic and hence stipulative statements are presented as being merely definitions whose meanings consist of how we use certain terms by convention, and cannot be claimed as incontrovertably true either. Our knowledge is supposedly extended by falsifying and confirming hypotheses.<br /><br />------<br /><br />It is rather straightforward to learn the self-contradictory nature of this. We can just take the above as a given truth, for argument's sake, and just ask "OK, then what kind of a statement is the EP statement: "All statements are either empirical or analytic"?<br /><br />If EP is valid, then the statement "All statements are either empirical or analytic" must itself be either an empirical statement, or an analytic statement:<br /><br />1. If it is an empirical statement, then it is just a hypothesis that must in principle be subject to falsification. It cannot be incontrovertibly true.<br /><br />2. If it is an analytic statement, then it is just a stipulation of how we define statements. Well then so what, definitions can be what anyone wants them to be. I am entitled to define statements differently.<br /><br />Neither of these available options can qualify EP as an epistemology. They can only make it either a hypothesis that could be wrong, or merely a definition. But then how can we even know what hypotheses and definitions are, if we are only told in EP that <i>all</i> statements are either hypotheses or definitions? Clearly something is missing.<br /><br />Is there a <i>third</i> possibility for what kind of a statement it is? How about neither empirical NOR analytic, yet still says something true about reality? If this the case, and I submit this is the one being practically and theoretically advanced, then EPs must admit that their own doctrine is wrong, for they are advancing a statement that is not of a type that they believe all statements must be!Major_Freedomnoreply@blogger.com